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ABSTRACT: Infrastructure can be unreliable and administration subject to corruption in Asia’s rapidly 
developing economies. Foreign investment is thus drawn to privileged investment enclaves, as well as 
in and around centers of international infrastructure. This context provides opportunity for Singapore-
styled industrial parks, through the provision of superior infrastructure, the ability to negotiate 
investment concessions at inter-government level and, where existing, through the links to influential 
Chinese business groups in the investment location. Batamindo Industrial Park and Bintan Industrial 
Estate in Indonesia were the prototypes. This paper revisits the Parks, and offers a stock-take on the 
challenges confronting these flagship projects. Evidence from on-site surveys and interviews are 
presented. This paper concludes that the raison d’etre for the projects has overestimated the 
attractiveness of the low-cost investment enclaves for multinational companies, and the projects’ 
potential has been largely overshadowed by socio-political uncertainties in the host environment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Singapore, being the small city-state that it is, has been driven to hone its ability to leverage global 
resources for economic growth. Singapore’s long-established stratagem of economic development 
through foreign direct investments (FDI) has been well documented (Chia, 1986; Pang, 1987). 
However, rising business costs in the 1980s made it imperative for Singapore to redistribute its labor-
intensive activities to neighboring areas, and forge important linkages with low cost production 
environments in the immediate region (Singapore Economic Development Board, 1993, 1995; Singapore 
Ministry of Finance, 1993; Kanai, 1993; Mahiznan, 1994; Kwok, 1995; Pang, 1995; Tan, 1995; Kraar, 
1996).  
  
It had long been recognized that the Singapore-Indonesia border zone, notably the nearby Riau 
islands (Batam and Bintan), were capable of attracting labor-intensive industries, and activities with 
extensive space requirements that are closely linked with Singapore-based activity. However, this 
potential remained unexploited (Rice, 1989). In 1989, following inter-governmental contacts, Singapore 
renewed its interest in participating in the development of these islands. The southern Malaysian state 
of Johor was soon included to form the tripartite initiative known as the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore 
Growth Triangle (Lee, 1991; Perry, 1991; Parsonage, 1992; Toh and Low, 1993; Ho, 1994; Kumar and 
Siddique, 1994; Naidu, 1994; Peachey, et al., 1998; Grundy-Warr, et al., 1999). The growth triangle, 
as a concept, and a reality, is passé but interest on the Riau Islands as centers of development 
attention remains.  
 
This paper revisits Singapore’s flagship projects – Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP) and Bintan 
Industrial Estate (BIE). To provide the context for the discussion, the theoretical considerations 
underpinning the flagship projects are sketched in the next section. The following section takes a 
closer look at the Parks’ progress, and examines the challenges confronting the projects, using 
empirical surveys of the Parks’ tenants to reinforce the analyses. The final section considers the 
implications of the new evidence to Singapore’s broader regionalization initiative.  
 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS … 
 
Several theories have been expounded on the economic integration of regions to spearhead economic 
growth and development. Perroux (1950; 1955) postulated the concept of growth poles. In essence, this 
concept projects the notion of an economic space as a field of forces consisting of a nucleus from which 
centrifugal forces emanate and centripetal forces are attracted. Bouderville (1966), extending Perroux's 
concept, has defined a regional growth pole as a set of expanding industries located in an urban area 
inducing further developments of economic activity through its zone of influence. Hirschman (1958), 
Darwent (1969), Hermansen (1972) and Campbell (1974) added the thesis that inter-industry, multiplier 
and accelerator linkages play a major role in the development of growth poles and growth centers. Cost 
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reductions through productivity gains, innovations and scale economies are viewed as providing the 
opportunities for propulsive industries to initiate growth, and to pass growth impulses through the linkage 
chains. The discourse on growth poles has been extended, in more recent literature, to deliberations on 
the presence of immobile clusters of complementary value-added activities (Markusen, 1996), the 
transactional benefits of spatial proximity (surveyed in Dunning, 1998) and, in the context of this paper, on 
notions of growth zones, `defined’ as the spread from the early nuclei of economic activities to territories 
adjacent, or in close proximity, to longer established nuclei of industrial growth. In the 1990s, set in the 
context of the globalization of economic activities, the phenomenon took on cross-border dimensions with 
the promulgation of regional economic zones (Parsonage, 1997; Chia and Lee, 1993; Thant, et al, 1994; 
van Grunsven, 1994; van Grunsven, et al, 1995).  
 
Location theories and, in particular, the agglomeration aspects suggest that there are scale economies to 
be derived through certain types of industries, or industrial clusters within a region, namely, internal 
economies, localization economies, and external economies (Parr, 1965). The agglomeration aspects, as 
applied to the Singapore-Riau `alliance’, include localization economies, urbanization economies, 
standardization economies and network externalities (Ng and Wong, 1991). Rationalization theories 
suggest that firms should redistribute their operations in different location to capitalize on the comparative 
advantages offered in each location. These theories argue that the production process should be viewed 
as a value chain, and firms should identify the comparative or location-specific advantages unique to 
each country/territory, and the competitive or firm-specific advantages unique to the firm/core functions, 
and then incorporate these advantages into the value chain (Kogut, 1985; Porter, 1986, 1994, 1996). In 
this respect, BIP and BIE, given the close proximity to Singapore, fits in strategically (Liew, 1990; Yeoh, 
1990, 1993; Ho and So, 1997). 
 
The strategic thrust of the flagship projects was to get investors to look at Singapore and the Riau 
islands, which are at different stages of development, as a single investment region, and not as separate 
states competing for investments. The flagship projects presented investors with a packaged choice to 
locate the activities along their value chains in the contiguous areas to support "the whole range of 
business requirements" (SEDB, 1989/1990:26) within a single region. Singapore, for instance, can 
support business operations dependent on advanced technology and sophisticated services, while low 
value, labor-intensive industries can be located in Riau. Specialization in this way is designed to attract 
investment by enabling investors to retain activities in close proximity while making use of contrasting 
environments i.e. complementary specialization in national border territories (Reza, 1994). In the 
process, these firms, with their various activities located in close proximity, also reap the economies of 
agglomeration suggested by location theories. 
 
THE INDONESIAN PARKS 
 
Indonesia’s ambition to develop the Riau islands dates back to the late 1960s when Batam was 
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identified as a potential logistics and operational base to support offshore oil and gas fields. Nissho-
Iwai, a Japanese consultancy firm, and Bechtel of the United States, prepared the first master plan for 
Pertamina, Indonesia’s state-owned oil company. The original master plan was reviewed by the 
American consultants, CRUX, in 1977. A significant step in the island’s development was the 
assignment of Batam’s development responsibility to the Batam Industrial Development Authority 
(BIDA) in 1978, under the chairmanship of B.J. Habibie, the then Minister of Research and 
Technology. Habibie favored attempts to engineer accelerated technological breakthroughs based on 
state-directed investment. This belief in the ability to accelerate development processes was reflected 
in the 1979 master plan for Batam.  
 
The 1979 plan focused on the development of trans-shipment facilities, the establishment of industrial 
estates, the development of marshalling areas for imports and exports, the construction of tourist facilities 
and the provision of infrastructural support. This master plan recognized that the Riau islands were well-
positioned to address Singapore’s land and labor constraints and, more importantly, to take advantage of 
Singapore's established business and financial services network and the city-state's efficient facilities for 
communication, transportation and other services.  
 
The cataclysmic collapse of oil prices in the early 1980s impressed upon Indonesia's economic planners 
the need for a more broad-based development strategy. Deregulatory measures were introduced to 
stimulate the non-oil sectors of the Indonesian economy. Infrastructural facilities were improved, and 
investment incentives were liberalized to mobilize private sector investments, including foreign 
investments. The Riau islands were an obvious choice to encourage investments not least because 
Singapore has shown interest in leasing these nearby islands to transcend the city-state's need for 
inexpensive land and labor. By the late 1980s, the perception from Jakarta was that Singapore was 
"bursting at the seams", and that the time was right to position Batam and the other Riau islands to take 
advantage of the spillover from Singapore (Batam Industrial Development Authority, 1991). Singapore’s 
preference for regulatory concessions had however, impeded talks between the two countries to 
cooperate in Riau’s development. These concessions were finally obtained in the late 1980s following 
renewed inter-government discussions (Yeoh, 1990; Regnier, 1991; Perry, 1991). Restrictions on 
foreign ownership, and the private development and control of industrial estates were relaxed. A 
Memorandum of Understanding on bilateral cooperation in the development of Riau Province and an 
investment guarantee between the two countries were signed on August 29, 1990.  
 
BIP was launched in 1992, with BIE following in 1994. The industrial parks were established as joint-
ventures between Singaporean government-linked companies (GLCs) and the Salim Group of 
Indonesia. Singapore leveraged on personal ties accords with business practice, which was preferred 
by the linked communities of `overseas Chinese’ (Redding, 1990; Yeung, 1997, Brown, 1998; Lehman, 
1998), in its industrial parks in Indonesia (and China). The Singapore consortium was led by 
Singapore Technologies Industrial Corporation (now SembCorp Industries) and Jurong Town 
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Corporation, Singapore’s main industrial estate infrastructure developer. Salim was Indonesia’s largest 
business conglomerate. Salim had close links to senior politicians and had privileged access to the 
major investment projects in the Riau Islands (Sato, 1993; Hill, 1996). Singaporean GLCs were given 
control over the development and management of the Parks, while Salim’s role was to facilitate 
operations and to provide a guarantee of priority over regulatory controls and administrative approvals. 
Singapore’s reputation for transparent and efficient management of projects lent further credibility to 
the projects and maximized marketing leverage over Singapore-based multinationals (Perry and Yeoh, 
2000). 
 
The Parks are broadly identical, although BIE had the potential to be a significantly larger project. Both 
were envisaged as self-contained environments with their communication and business linkages 
through Singapore rather than through Indonesia. BIP, for example, has its own power supply, water 
treatment plant, sewerage system, telecommunications facilities, and commercial centre with a market, 
shops, a bank, restaurants, supermarkets, a mosque and a 24-hour medical centre. Labor is recruited 
from outside Batam and Bintan. Self-containment is a practical necessity because of limited 
surrounding infrastructure and population. Self-containment, in this context, has resulted in an 
investment enclave offering facilities close to conditions in Singapore, in marked contrast to the 
conditions immediate outside the Parks. This is also designed to aid the marketing of the Parks by 
providing Singapore development standards in a low-income economy.  
 
Progress … 
 
BIP’s first tenants were mainly subsidiaries of American, European, and Japanese multinationals 
already operating in Singapore (Yeoh, et al, 1992). Cumulative investments and export value in BIP 
topped US$1billion and US$2 billion in 2002 respectively, and the number of confirmed tenants 
increased from 17 in 1991 to 88 in 2002. The Park's industrial niche is assembly operations employing 
young female labor. Out of total employment of over 66,000, over 85% are female, most aged from 18-
22. The industrial workforce recorded in the Park accounted for more than 60% of the island's total 
industrial employment in 2002. As at June 2002, 42 of the tenants were Japanese companies with 
Singapore the next largest concentration. American and European investors have a limited presence. 
There is a particular concentration of electronics operations, mainly various component assembly 
processes, and supporting activities to the electronics sector such as plastic molding and packaging 
(Batamindo Industrial Park Fact Sheet, June 2002).  
 
BIE's initial marketing targeted textiles and garments, and other light industries. Wood processing did 
not take off, and access to Singapore's export quota under the multi-fiber agreement expired in 1996, 
leading to a change in marketing emphasis. Electronics has been added to the marketing priorities 
since September 1997. As at June 2002, cumulative investment commitments by BIE’s tenants was 
US$105 million, and export value was only US$283 million. BIE’s performance remains modest, with 
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only 35 tenants and 13,000 workers (against the original projection of 130,000). Only 110 hectares of 
the 4000-hectare project has been developed, at a cost of US$113 million. The project has since been 
downsized to a 500-hectare development. BIE’s investor profile is largely Singaporean (66%), mostly 
engaged in low value-added, light industries (Bintan Industrial Estate Fact Sheet, June 2002). 
 
METHOD 
 
Prior studies on BIP and BIE have relied primarily on secondary data from official publications, press 
reports, fact sheets, etc. These analyses cannot adequately reflect the differential impact of various 
pull factors on the investment decision of different types on investors, or the differential impact of 
different types of constraints on the operations of firms with different characteristics. To add empirical 
rigor to this paper, we conducted on-site questionnaire surveys and in-depth interviews in BIP and BIE.  
 
The survey questionnaire, adapted from Yeoh, et al (2000), was applied to the tenants in BIP and BIE. 
The first set of questions sought to determine the profile of the respondents: type of ownership, nature 
of operations and size of establishment; and, the second set was structured to gather information on 
the push-pull factors influencing the respondents’ decision to set up their manufacturing operations in 
the Parks, and the various constraints on the site operations. Other questions pertaining to the 
respondents’ views on the facilities and services in BIP and BIE were culled from the open-ended 
questions. SembCorp Industries facilitated the on-site interviews, and provided the tenants’ list for both 
sites. 64 companies participated in the survey. 
 
Statistical Treatment of Survey Results 
 
The (cumulative) logistic distribution function, estimated by the maximum likelihood, takes the following 
form: 
Pi = exp(Zi) / [ 1 + exp(Zi)] 
 Where:   Pi is the probability of firm i choosing the factor in question, 
                exp refers to the exponentiation operator and 
       Zi is a linear function of the firm attributes* defined as   
 
 Zi = α0 + α1S + α2F + α3M + α4 L 
where:    S = 1 if wholly Singapore-owned, 0 otherwise 
          F = 1 if wholly foreign-owned, 0 otherwise 
        M = 1 if medium-size (100 – 499 employees), 0 otherwise 
         L = 1 if large (> 500 employees), 0 otherwise 
        α0 = constant term 
                      αi = coefficient of independent (explanatory) variable 
 
*For BIE, all α have been substituted with ß and, nature of operations (i.e. manufacturer of consumer products (MCP) 
and manufacturer of industrial products (MIP)) has been introduced into the logit estimations.  
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Hence, if the estimated coefficients in the logit model is statistically significant (as indicated by the z- 
statistics and p-values), this would imply that the probability of a firm (e.g. foreign-owned) choosing a 
particular factor is greater than the probability of another firm (of different ownership type) making the 
choice, after taking into consideration the size of the firms. The logit estimations are summarized in 
Tables 1 to 4.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Profile of Respondents 
 
Of the 39 BIP survey respondents, 14 (36%) were wholly Singapore-owned, 3 (8%) were Japan-
Singapore joint ventures and 22 (56%) were wholly foreign-owned. In terms of operations, 28 and 4 of 
the respondents manufactured intermediate products and consumer products respectively. In terms of 
employment size, medium-sized firms totaled 21. There were 3 small firms, 21 medium-sized firms 
and 15 large firms. Only 1 respondent invested less than S$1 million, while 17 firms invested within the 
range of S$1-5 million and another 13 firms, S$6-20 million. The remaining 8 firms reportedly invested 
over S$20 million in their BIP operations. 
 
There were 25 respondents in the BIE survey, of which 17 (68%) were wholly Singapore-owned 
enterprises, and the remaining 8 firms (32%) were foreign-owned. The respondents engaged mainly in 
the manufacturing of consumer goods. 5 of the respondents were involved in the capital goods sector, 
and another 4 manufactured intermediate goods. In terms of employment size, there were 4 small 
firms, 14 medium-sized firms and 7 large firms. 12 of the respondents invested within the range of 
S$1-5 million. 8 firms invested less than S$1 million, while the remaining 5 firms invested S$6-20 
million.
 
Factors Influencing Respondents’ Investment Decisions  
 
Competitive labor costs, excellent infrastructure, political commitment from the Singapore government, 
proximity to Singapore and investment incentives were the five most frequently cited factors among 
the major considerations for the tenants’ establishment of manufacturing operations in BIP. These 
factors were highlighted by 80%, 80%, 74%, 64% and 43% of respondents respectively. Less than 
30% cited low rental costs, availability of skilled/educated labor force and raw materials, proximity to 
important markets, political commitment from Indonesian government, and the presence of major 
buyers and competitors as the “pull” factors that influenced their decisions to invest in BIP.  
 
Competitive labor costs and infrastructural facilities were the two most frequently cited factors that 
influenced the tenants’ decisions to invest in BIP. These factors were clearly among the major 
considerations of the Singaporean and foreign firms, as evidenced by the positive and statistically 
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significant α1 (= 0.263, 2.233) and α2 (= 0.776, 2.588) respectively. These results may be expected 
since Batam offers an ample supply of cheap labor, which may attract many MNCs to reside their 
labor-intensive operations in BIP. In addition, the infrastructure in BIP is indicative of Singapore’s 
expertise in such ‘hardware’ development, attracting many MNCs to BIP. Political commitment from 
Singapore appeared to be an important consideration among foreign and Singaporean firms as shown 
by the positive and statistically significant α1 (= 1.448) and α2 (= 1.123). To a certain extent, the 
Singapore government’s regionalization plan has spurred many of the Singaporean firms to venture 
into BIP. The proximity of BIP to Singapore clearly is another important ‘pull’ factor among 
Singaporean and foreign firms, indicated by the nonnegative and significant α1 (= 1.225) and α2 (= 
1.285). An interesting observation was the statistically significant α2 (= -1.532) for “preferential access 
to overseas markets”, which showed that foreign firms were unlikely to be influenced by this factor in 
their investment decision. This could be so for foreign firms due to their established marketing 
networks in other countries and/or their greater capacity to move into activities where GSP privileges 
are unimportant. The survey results indicate that most firms are primarily interested in the core factors 
(i.e. political climate, investment climate and strategic location), while the issue of Batam’s labor cost 
competitiveness has clearly assumed greater significance to these firms. 
 
The tenants in BIE ranked competitive labor costs, proximity to Singapore, the Indonesian government 
political commitment, political commitment from Singapore, and low rental costs as the five most 
important factors that influenced their choice of investment. These factors were selected by 92%, 84%, 
84%, 72% and 64% of the respondents respectively. The presence of major buyers, suppliers and 
major competitors, and the availability of skilled labor were seen as less significant ‘pull’ factors, and 
were cited by less than 25% of the tenants in BIE. A dominance of Singapore firms in BIE as well as a 
significant and non-negative ß1 at 1.8310 suggests that the proximity’s facilitation of transactions and 
transportation is a major consideration for these firms. The positive and significant coefficients ß2 (= 
1.792) and ß4 (= 1.099) further imply that proximity to Singapore is also important to the medium-sized 
firms that manufacture consumer products, as their products are trans-shipped through the city-state. 
 
Our findings indicate that factors such as political commitment from Singapore, investment incentives, 
and proximity to Singapore are high on the agenda of BIP and BIE investors. Singapore’s positive 
reputation for superior infrastructure, and corrupt-free administration, has introduced a marketing edge 
to the Parks. In addition, with their various activities located in close proximity, Singapore-based firms 
appear well-positioned to take leverage on the cost advantages in BIP and BIE, and to reap the 
economies of agglomeration proffered by location theories. Our research, however, alludes to emerging 
constraints within the operating environment of the Parks, and from the broader environment in which the 
Parks are located. 
 
Constraints Faced by Respondents' Operations 
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The constraints are broadly classified into 3 categories: labor, organization and technology, and the 
environment. 
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Labor-Related Constraints  
 
The five most frequently cited labor constraints confronting BIP tenants were the shortage of semi-
skilled and skilled labor, high and/or rising labor costs, shortage of R&D personnel for product/process 
development, low labor productivity, and labor absenteeism. 79% of the respondents identified 
shortage of skilled labor among the major constraints on their manufacturing operations in BIP while 
33% reported significant problems recruiting R&D personnel. High and/or rising labor costs posed 
serious problems for 50% of firms while 26% and 10% of the respondents complained of low labor 
productivity and labor absenteeism respectively. 
 
Both Singaporean and foreign firms were likely to consider shortages of semi-skilled and skilled labor 
as significant problems (α1(= 3.806, 2.633) and α2 (= 3.047, 2.201)). This was, however, not the case 
for low labor productivity with the negative and statistically significant α1(= -1.161) and α2(= -2.114). 
High and/or rising labor costs also posed problems for these firms, as evidenced by the positive and 
statistically significant α1 (= 3.370) and α2 (= 2.789). Both medium-sized and large firms found the high 
and/or rising labor costs and the shortage of R&D personnel to be significant constraints in their 
operations in BIP, as indicated by α3 (= 2.115, 2.157) and α4 (= 2.558, 1.946). It is interesting that in 
BIP, the lack of `research’ personnel as well as skilled and semi-skilled labor, has been a constraint to 
the firms surveyed. Since BIP was never touted as a centre for research excellence, neither was it 
marketed as a park with access to skilled labor, these results suggest that companies may prefer to 
have some product/process development work done on-site.  
 
 
Tenants in the BIE faced similar constraints to those in BIP. In the order of their frequency, labor 
absenteeism, high and/or rising labor costs, and low labor productivity were ranked as the three most 
crucial constraints. These factors are cited by 88%, 72%, and 60% of the respondents respectively. 
Given the negative and statistically significant ß2 (= -2.757), it can be inferred that the medium-sized 
companies have not been particularly perturbed by shortages of semi-skilled labor. These companies 
may have either been sourcing for such labor elsewhere, or there may not even be a need for them. 
Consumer goods manufacturers find the current level of productivity unsatisfactory, as can be seen 
from the non-negative and significant ß4 (= 2.693) for low labor productivity. Production levels can be 
further optimized if productivity standards are addressed promptly. Finally, the non-convergence of 
shortage of unskilled labor for all categories of firms tallies with the fact that they are aplenty in BIE. 
Low labor productivity continues to plague BIE, and noticeably, Singaporean firms in both BIE, and 
BIP, were more likely to find this a constraint on their operations. 
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Organizational and Technology-Related Constraints  
 
The most frequently cited problems faced by firms in BIP were, in order of ranking, difficulties in 
obtaining quality support services, procuring materials and components locally, acquiring/adapting 
essential technologies, and the high and/or rising overhead and material costs. These constraints were 
highlighted by 72%, 33%, 31%, 54%, and 13% of the respondents respectively. More interesting were 
the statistically significant α1 (= 2.328) and α2 (= 1.614) for high and/or rising overhead costs. These 
results indicate that both Singaporean and foreign firms are facing rising overhead costs and are 
paying heed to these cost constraints. It may be argued that foreign firms, with their greater resources, 
would have less difficulty in adjusting to these cost constraints but, all the same, this issue needs 
attention. On the other hand, as suggested by the negative and statistically significant α1 (= -1.804) 
and α2 (= -0.244), firms have in BIP have little difficulty in getting quality support services. Proximity to 
Singapore, and the location economies thereof, would be a plausible explanation. 
 
The three most frequently encountered constraints faced by firms in BIE are high and/or rising material 
costs, followed closely by difficulties in procuring materials, and difficulties in acquiring and/or adapting 
essential technologies. 44% of the respondents encountered difficulties with respect to high material 
costs, of which 36% were local firms and 32% were manufacturers of consumer products. This acute 
constraint is due largely to the fact that firms have been sourcing for their materials from Singapore or 
elsewhere other than Bintan, because of unavailability or otherwise. This problem would naturally 
entail problems in procuring materials as well. 
 
However, the large negative and significant ß4 (= -2.83) suggests the procurement of materials may 
not be an onerous task for consumer products manufacturers, even if they complain about high 
material costs. This could be due to the manufacturers sourcing for materials from elsewhere. 
Manufacturers of consumer products also do not face much difficulty in obtaining new equipment and 
machinery with a negative and statistically significant ß4 (= -1.51). As most of the firms falling under 
this category are garment manufacturers, which do not require much sophisticated machinery, it 
naturally follows that this constraint would not pose too much of a problem for them. 
 
Environment-Related Constraints  
 
46% of the respondents cited “impact of government policies/regulations” as the major problem 
confronting their operations in BIP. Only 18% and 8% of the respondents cited competition from 
overseas competitors and protectionism as important constraints. BIE, in comparison, places impact of 
government policies/regulations behind competition from overseas competitors based in ASEAN. 
Competition from China, Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore were cited as the more critical 
‘environmental” constraints. The majority of BIE respondents (68%) are finding it a challenge to stay 
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competitive with firms based in other ASEAN economies, whereas only 24% cited competition from 
Singapore-based firms as an important constraint. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
From our empirical studies, the consensus is that the political climate created by the Singapore and 
Indonesian governments, the factor conditions, infrastructure and the proximity to Singapore are the 
main determinants that shape the competitive environment in the Parks. The tenants were able to tap 
into the low-cost environments of the Parks, as well as leverage on Singapore’s infrastructure, 
management and expertise. These results lend support to rationalization theories, and affirm the 
agglomeration economies suggested by location theory. 
 
The questionnaire survey, and in-depth interviews with selected companies, also delved into some 
unresolved issues that may erode the competitive edge of the Parks. Labor-related constraints such as 
the shortage of skilled labor, low labor productivity, and rising labor costs posed problems to most of 
the tenants surveyed. Difficulties in getting quality support services, as well as rising material costs 
were the most frequently cited organizational and technological constraints faced. It is perceived that 
rising manufacturing cost increases may negate the cost advantage of firms moving their operations to 
the Parks. The survey results also highlighted the obtuse impact of government policies/regulations on 
the respondents’ operations in the Parks.  
 
On a broader front, it is not yet clear that Singapore has obtained the resource benefits looked for. 
Issues pertaining to the scale and character of development of the Parks, viz, BIP’s resemblance to a 
Japanese investment enclave; BIP’s surrounding environment and the tensions of squatter 
settlements; heightened competition for BIP from cheaper alternative sites on the island; BIE’s 
infrastructural dilemmas and the restricted appeal of its operating conditions; as well as the limited 
impact of the Indonesia parks on the transfer of low value operations from Singapore are taken up in 
other papers (Yeoh, et al, 2003a; 2003b). Operating conditions in particular, could threaten Indonesia’s 
investment climate due to its high labor costs for labor-intensive industries (US$66 per month), as 
compared to Myanmar’s (US$16) and Bangladesh’s (US$18). Foreign investors have also taken issue 
over the perceived reluctance of authorities to clamp down on worksite stoppages (The Straits Times, 
August 24, 2002); a further reflection of unfavorable operating conditions. The Parks’ reputation as 
investment enclaves has not been left unscathed by political developments in Indonesia, in the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis.  
 
The end of the Soeharto era has diminished Salim’s political and commercial influence. Salim’s 
reputation took a further dip when the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency had reportedly offered to 
sell the Group’s stakes in all the Riau projects – estimated to be worth S$500 million – in a packaged 
deal (The Business Times, August 28, 2001). With respect to the Riau projects, further restructuring 
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have taken place, with the three main stakeholders now being SembCorp Industries (SCI), Ascendas 
(a JTC-linked company) and the Indonesian government. Ownership changes at BIP and BIE have as 
a result introduced uncertainties, as the Parks’ privileged access to senior politicians and policy-
makers in Jakarta has proved more difficult. Moreover, inter-governmental endorsements, post-
Soeharto, no longer suffice to secure commitments at the lower tiers of government; due to a large 
degree of inconsistency in provincial versus national laws. Regional autonomy laws (nos. 22 and 25 of 
1999), introduced by the Habibie government, have allowed provincial, district and municipal 
governments to write provincial laws, some of which contradict national laws, or test the boundaries of 
their power. Such procedures will only add longer-term uncertainties to the Parks’ operating 
environment. The Megawati administration is now proposing a revision of laws on regional autonomy, 
but the direction remains unclear.  
 
Lastly, anecdotal evidence from our September 2002 interviews with BIP and BIE executives, points to 
a more complex regulatory environment for investors, as they have to deal more intensively with the 
provincial and sub-provincial (district) governments. BIP struggles to maintain investor interest, while 
BIE has yet to gain investor momentum. All said, the economic `theorization’ that underscores this 
trans-border initiative has been overshadowed by the political nuances that radiate from the host 
environment and, one must add, overtaken by the economic realities of Asia’s new `powerhouses’ – 
Vietnam, India and China. 
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Table 1 
 Factors Influencing the Respondents’ Decisions to Invest in BIP and BIE 
(by Maximum Likelihood Estimates - Binary Logit)ψ, φ 
 
 Batamindo Industrial Park Bintan Industrial Estate 
Variables Type of Ownership Employment Size Type of Ownership Employment Size Nature of Operations 
 
 Singapore Foreign Medium Large Singapore Medium Large MCP MIP 
 (α1) (α2) (α3) (α4) (ß1) (ß2) (ß3) (ß4) (ß5) 
Political commitment from Singapore 1.448 1.123 1.048 2.886 -0.661 1.840 1.123 0.781 1.705 
 (0.055)** (0.016)** (0.026)** (0.019)** (0.416) (0.053)# (0.206) (0.196) (0.117) 
Political commitment from Indonesia 1.122 0.841 1.809 0.500 -0.055 n.c. 0.916 2.515 1.457 
 (0.031)** (0.045)** (0.132) (0.813) (0.955) n.c. (0.273) (0.071)# (0.188) 
Investment incentives  -0.085 -0.799 -2.067 -2.221 -0.110 -1.463 -2.014 0.147 2.273 
 (0.945) (0.552) (0.0234)** (0.015)** (0.931) (0.251) (0.273) (0.889) (0.194) 
Preferential access  -0.781 -1.532 -0.550 0.141 0.373 -1.667 -1.462 -0.497 1.724 
 (0.392) (0.036)** (0.553) (0.932) (0.767) (0.199) (0.357) (0.620) (0.285) 
Availability of raw materials 0.612 0.922 1.246 1.955 -0.864 -0.655 0.541 -1.374 -0.061 
 (0.686) (0.571) (0.492) (0.352) (0.266) (0.445) (0.505) (0.038)# (0.938) 
Relatively low rental costs 0.231 0.949 2.144 4.879 -1.033 1.769 2.168 -0.948 1.548 
 (0.794) (0.684) (0.196) (0.232) (0.238) (0.067)# (0.063)# (0.346) (0.162) 
Competitive labor costs 0.263 0.776 1.370 0.996 1.377 0.831 1.522 1.601 1.548 
 (0.042)** (0.053)** (0.023)** (0.005)* (0.146) (0.394) (0.167) (0.255) (0.162) 
Availability of skilled/educated labor force -0.228 0.619 0.919 0.315 -0.989 -1.867 -0.679 -1.924 0.494 
 (0.804) (0.519) (0.350) (0.187) (0.274) (0.116) (0.434) (0.166) (0.810) 
Infrastructural facilities 2.233 2.588 1.096 1.292 0.736 -1.181 n.c. -0.743 0.804 
 (0.011)* (0.005)* (0.021)** (0.05)** (0.397) (0.197) n.c. (0.427) (0.336) 
Proximity to Singapore 1.225 1.285 1.218 0.435 1.831 1.792 -0.288 1.099 -0.406 
 (0.017)** (0.014)** (0.018)** (0.042)** (0.051)# (0.019)# (0.706) (0.072)# (0.596) 
Proximity to important markets -1.904 -2.040 -2.460 -2.872 2.610 -2.346 -3.115 -1.812 2.860 
 (0.278) (0.2626) (0.301) (0.111) (0.098)# (0.101)# (0.086)# (0.112) (0.117) 
Presence of major buyers/suppliers n.c. n.c. n.c. n.c. 0.735 -1.508 -2.676 -0.970 1.366 
     (0.584) (0.247) (0.148) (0.391) (0.427) 
Presence of major competitors n.c. n.c. n.c. n.c. -1.684 -1.963 -1.601 -0.362 -0.971 
     (0.135) (0.101) (0.145) (0.762) (0.286) 
 
Note: ψ Estimated values were taken from the final stepwise regression.        MCP = Manufacturer of Consumer Products 
          φ Values in parentheses are p-values for 2-tailed tests.        MIP = Manufacturer of Intermediate Products 
          * Significant at 1% level 
        ** Significant at 5% level                           # Significant at 5% and 10% levels 
      *** Significant at 10% level 
     n.c. Non-convergence 
Source: Questionnaire surveys 
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Table 2 
Labor Constraints on Respondents’ Operations in BIP and BIE 
(by Maximum Likelihood Estimates - Binary Logit)ψ, φ 
 
 Batamindo Industrial Park Bintan Industrial Estate 
Variables Type of Ownership Employment Size Type of 
Ownership 
Employment Size Nature of Operations 
 
 Singapore Foreign Medium Large Singapore Medium Large MCP MIP 
 (α1) (α2) (α3) (α4) (ß1) (ß2) (ß3) (ß4) (ß5) 
          
Shortage of unskilled labor n.c. n.c. n.c. n.c. n.c. n.c. n.c. n.c. n.c. 
 n.c. n.c. n.c. n.c. n.c. n.c. n.c. n.c. n.c. 
Shortage of semi-skilled labor 3.806 3.047 n.c. n.c. -0.751 -2.757 -0.357 -0.478 -1.787 
 (0.050)** (0.089)*** n.c. n.c. (0.444) (0.026)# (0.656) (0.670) (0.111) 
Shortage of skilled labor 2.633 2.021 -1.025 -0.387 -0.094 -0.584 -0.238 -1.460 -1.708 
 (0.052)** (0.019)** (0.492) (0.779) (0.947) (0.675) (0.896) (0.210) (0.349) 
Shortage of R& D personnel  0.049 0.355 2.157 1.946 -1.277 -0.892 n.c. -1.600 -1.548 
 (0.962) (0.685) (0.060)*** (0.091)*** (0.187) (0.366) n.c. (0.255) (0.162) 
Low labor productivity -1.161 -2.114 -3.466 0.950 -2.152 0.993 0.627 2.693 -0.985 
 (0.040)** (0.094)*** (0.705) (0.295) (0.172) (0.470) (0.726) (0.032)# (0.568) 
Labor absenteeism -0.838 0.855 -3.246 1.913 -0.183 1.124 n.c. 1.906 -0.909 
 (0.707) (0.686) (0.043)** (0.202) (0.907) (0.504) n.c. (0.208) (0.674) 
High and/or rising labor costs 3.370 2.789 2.115 2.558 1.186 -0.167 0.029 0.633 0.932 
 (0.014)** (0.018)** (0.051)** (0.097)*** (0.227) (0.849) (0.981) (0.434) (0.426) 
 
Note: ψ Estimated values were taken from the final stepwise regression.       MCP = Manufacturer of Consumer Products 
          φ Values in parentheses are p-values for 2-tailed tests.       MIP = Manufacturer of Intermediate Products 
          * Significant at 1% level 
        ** Significant at 5% level                         # Significant at 5% and 10% levels 
      *** Significant at 10% level 
     n.c. Non-convergence 
 
Source: Questionnaire surveys 
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Table 3 
Organizational and Technological Constraints on Respondents’ Operations in BIP 
 (by Maximum Likelihood Estimates - Binary Logit) ψ, φ 
 
 Batamindo Industrial Park Bintan Industrial Estate 
Variables Type of Ownership Employment Size Type of 
Ownership 
Employment Size Nature of Operations 
 
 Singapore Foreign Medium Large Singapore Medium Large MCP MIP 
 (α1) (α2) (α3) (α4) (ß1) (ß2) (ß3) (ß4) (ß5) 
          
Difficulties in procuring materials locally n.c. n.c. 0.696 0.675 2.275 -1.336 0.794 -2.831 0.226 
   (0.413) (0.469) (0.162) (0.350) (0.660) (0.031)# (0.902) 
Difficulties in obtaining/introducing 
new equipment/machinery 
n.c. n.c. n.c. n.c. -1.302 
(0.128) 
-0.877 
(0.345) 
1.354 
(0.146) 
-1.511 
(0.026)# 
0.550 
(0.486) 
          
Difficulties in acquiring/adapting 
essential technologies 
0.939 
(0.319) 
-1.01 
(0.306) 
0.107 
(0.747) 
0.086 
(0.928) 
-0.763 
(0.393) 
-1.401 
(0.119) 
0.881 
(0.308) 
0.332 
(0.726) 
-0.639 
(0.437) 
          
Difficulties in getting quality support 
services 
-1.805 
(0.024)** 
-0.244 
(0.081)*** 
0.645 
(0.469) 
0.857 
(0.350) 
0.669 
(0.613) 
-2.594 
(0.089)# 
-2.066 
(0.238) 
-0.885 
(0.420) 
2.593 
(0.152) 
          
Difficulties in securing funds for 
expansion/investments 
0.315 
(0.823) 
-0.1534 
(0.905) 
-1.036 
(0.440) 
1.845 
(0.177) 
-2.174 
(0.029)# 
-1.299 
(0.046)# 
-0.288 
(0.706) 
-1.198 
(0.274) 
0.441 
(0.597) 
          
High and/or rising material costs -1.283 -1.411 0.016 0.761 -1.245 1.526 1.009 0.192 -2.390 
 (0.339) (0.287) (0.986) (0.445) (0.368) (0.245) (0.530) (0.846) (0.151) 
High and/or rising overhead costs 2.328 1.614 0.660 0.802 -0.468 1.333 0.120 -0.887 -2.394 
 (0.01)* (0.05)** (0.403) (0.341) (0.739) (0.320) (0.946) (0.435) (0.195) 
 
Note: ψ Estimated values were taken from the final stepwise regression.       MCP = Manufacturer of Consumer Products 
          φ Values in parentheses are p-values for 2-tailed tests.       MIP = Manufacturer of Intermediate Products 
          * Significant at 1% level 
        ** Significant at 5% level                         # Significant at 5% and 10% levels 
      *** Significant at 10% level 
     n.c. Non-convergence 
 
Source: Questionnaire surveys 
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Table 4 
Environmental Constraints on Respondents’ Operations in BIP and BIE 
(by Maximum Likelihood Estimates - Binary Logit) ψ, φ 
 
 Batamindo Industrial Park Bintan Industrial Estate 
Variables Type of Ownership Employment Size Type of 
Ownership 
Employment Size Nature of Operations 
 
 Singapore Foreign Medium Large Singapore Medium Large MCP MIP 
 (α1) (α2) (α3) (α4) (ß1) (ß2) (ß3) (ß4) (ß5) 
          
Impact of government 
policies/regulations 
-8.660 
(0.102) 
-8.575 
(0.095) 
0.129 
(0.081) 
0.322 
   (0.065) 
1.088 
(0.421) 
-0.669 
(0.591) 
1.319 
(0.445) 
-1.421 
(0.188) 
1.341 
(0422) 
              
Competition from Singapore-based 
companies 
n.c. n.c. -0.179 
(0.905) 
-0.695 
(0.647) 
-1.430 
(0.111) 
0.507 
(0.572) 
-1.516 
(0.168) 
-1.128 
(0211) 
0.114 
(0.929) 
                
Competition from overseas competitors  -0.373 0.666 -0.688 0.030 -0.174 0.770 0.624 0.232 0.359 
 (0.764) (0.591) (0.489) (0.976) (0.889) (0.552) (0.683) (0.813) (0.821) 
          
 
 
Note: ψ Estimated values were taken from the final stepwise regression.       MCP = Manufacturer of Consumer Products 
          φ Values in parentheses are p-values for 2-tailed tests.       MIP = Manufacturer of Intermediate Products 
          * Significant at 1% level          # Significant at 5% level 
        ** Significant at 5% level                         
     n.c. Non-convergence 
 
Source: Questionnaire surveys 
 
